A Failed Firewall? The Covert Acceptance of the Far-Right in Germany
As mainstream German parties break from a longstanding convention to keep the far-right away from power, the political landscape in Europe’s largest economy seems on the verge of a dangerous transformation.
For years, Germany’s mainstream parties have promised never to touch the AfD (Alternative for Germany), the German far-right party and ‘suspected extremist organisation’ now polling at over 20%. This much-vaunted ‘firewall’ (Brandmauer) against extremism has been observed by Germany’s major parties since the AfD’s foundation in 2013. Yet with the AfD projected to become the country’s second largest party in the coming February election, and the dominant party in at least 4 of Germany’s 12 federal states, cracks in the wall are on full display.
Alice Wiedel, leader of the AFD / Olaf Kosinsky
The centre-right CDU (Christian Democratic Union) has increasingly shown a willingness to collaborate with the AfD at both local and national levels. Leading Christian Democrats repeatedly insulted the AfD throughout the 2010s, with Merkel claiming that the party “stokes prejudice and division”, and Wolfgang Schäubler, then President of the Bundestag, labelling the AfD as an ‘extremist organisation. Yet during the first half of the 2020s, CDU delegates have voted alongside the AfD and relied upon AfD support for motions in the regional parliaments of Thuringia and Saxony with CDU members controversially supporting an AfD proposal to cut funding for refugees in Bautzen, Saxony in December 2022.
Friedrich Merz’s leadership of the CDU (since January 2022) has ushered in an era of covert cooperation with the AfD. In response to debates over local-level breaches of the firewall, Merz announced his support for ‘pragmatic dealings with the AfD at the local level’. Though he later backtracked on his comments under pressure, this marked a notable shift in rhetoric, with Merz having long supported a ‘calmer approach’ towards the far right. Most notably, a resolution filed by the CDU in the Bundestag on 29 January 2025, less than a month before the federal election, gained a majority through the support of the AfD, marking the first cooperation with the party at a national level and provoking national controversy.
The collapse of the CDU’s cordon sanitaire approach to the far-right may well serve to legitimize the AfD as a respectable option in the coming election, bringing what was formerly a fringe party into the political mainstream. An ominous parallel to events in Germany can be found in the Netherlands, where Geert Wilders’ far-right PVV more than doubled its vote share from 17 to 37 seats in an election campaign marked by the willingness of the centre-right VVD to collaborate with the far-right. PVV leader Dilan Yesilgöz was accused by political commentators of ‘making the PVV more acceptable’ through her rhetoric in the runup to the election, and her party eventually entered into coalition with the far-right following the PVV’s resounding victory in the election.
“The collapse of the CDU’s cordon sanitaire approach to the far-right may well serve to legitimize the AfD as a respectable option in the coming election, bringing what was formerly a fringe party into the political mainstream.”
In Germany, moreover, concessions to the far-right have been made across the political spectrum. Whilst the currently governing, centre-left SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) has not wholly abandoned its traditionally pro-migrant stance, restrictions on immigration have been tightened during their period of governance. Since September 2024, ‘temporary’ controls have been established on all of Germany’s borders, contradicting Schengen Zone ideals of free movement, whilst laws have been passed to ease deportations and to cut welfare payments for refugees. These measures have been accompanied by Scholz’s repeated calls for ‘deportations on a large scale’ alongside stricter immigration laws. The centre-left has long sought to court voters by echoing right-wing talking points – a strategy with an equally long record of failure. Yet the SPD aping the rhetoric of a party labelled as a ‘threat to democracy’ by its former leader suggests a more profound acceptance of the radical right.
The mainstream acceptance of the far-right in Germany has been partly facilitated by the AfD’s attempt to rid itself of extremist ties. The party’s co-leaders, Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla, have been described as belonging to the party’s ‘moderate’ wing. Weidel herself had been active in the ‘Alternative Centre’ faction of the party, denouncing the hardline views of Björn Höcke and Andreas Kalbitz, both of whom have links to neo-Nazi groups and have called for a ‘180 degree turnaround’ in Holocaust memorial policy. Yet a party which has openly called for the forced ‘remigration’ of immigrants, which could include naturalised German citizens, can hardly be labelled as moderate. Moreover, the AfD’s candidate for German chancellor, Alice Weidel, has herself been embroiled in controversy after labelling immigrants as ‘good-for-nothings’ and referring to the far-right Great Replacement conspiracy theory in a 2018 speech.
A sharp increase in public support for many of the AfD’s migration policies is also influencing the recent erosion of the firewall against the far-right. 37% of Germans view immigration as the key issue of the coming election, marking a dramatic upswing of 14% within two months from polls taken in December 2024. Another 8% see ‘homeland security from crime’ as the main problem facing the country. Deadly attacks in Aschaffenburg (January 2025) and Magdeburg (December 2024), both carried out by migrants to Germany, have triggered a surge in anti-immigrant sentiment, despite the fiercely islamophobic and pro-AfD views of the Magdeburg attacker. Indeed, it was in the wake of the Aschaffenburg attack that the CDU controversially relied on far-right support in proposing a resolution on immigration, with Weidel claiming that the firewall against the far-right is costing the lives of German citizens.
Despite the broadly rightwards drift of the political mainstream, there is significant resistance to the goals of the AfD across German society. In January 2024, widespread protests against right-wing extremism reached a size of 1.4 million people, a wave of rapidly organised demonstrations which was labelled as ‘the largest protest wave in the history of post-war Germany’. The outcry in early 2024 occurred in response to a report by the investigative journalist group Correctiv, which revealed the presence of office-holding politicians at a meeting of right-wing extremists at Potsdam in 2023. Last month, protests swept German cities in response to the CDU’s alleged abandonment of the Brandmauer around the AfD, with at least 250,000 demonstrating in Munich and over 160,000 in Berlin.
Demonstration in Stuttgart against the Far-Right, January 2024 / via Wikimedia Commons
Nonetheless, the powerful reaction against far-right politics in both early 2024 and 2025 appears to have had little effect on the upswing of support for the AfD. Partly, this can be taken to reflect the polarisation of the German political climate. For the support base of the far-right in the rural, peripheral towns of eastern Germany, mass demonstrations in Berlin and Munich may do little but emphasise the extent to which the AfD stands in opposition to the liberal consensus of the country’s major cities. Such a conclusion is hardly damaging to a populist party, and may even help to cement their image as a radical alternative to the status quo.
At the same time, the tacit acceptance of the far right by Germany’s mainstream parties has conferred a degree of respectability on the AfD, further reinforced by their growing presence in local government. Notably, Robert Sesselman was elected as the district administrator of Sonneberg, Thuringia in June 2023, whilst Tim Lochner became the mayor of Pirna, Saxony in December of the same year. This degree of establishment recognition has created greater trust in the AfD’s ability to govern and appears to have helped remove the party’s taboo status, with a 2024 survey revealing that 65% of Germans supported a closer engagement with the AfD by the other political parties in the Bundestag.
“The tacit acceptance of the far right by Germany’s mainstream parties has conferred a degree of respectability on the AfD, further reinforced by their growing presence in local government.”
As Europe’s largest economy struggles with the growing influence of the far-right, Germany’s political landscape is shifting in ways which were once unthinkable. The AfD has crafted its image as a radical yet viable alternative to the mainstream parties, balancing anti-establishment rhetoric with a degree of establishment recognition. With parties across the political spectrum making concessions and far-right rhetoric gaining traction, Germany’s coming election is set to be a major test of the country’s political norms and democratic system.